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I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Jason Cross (a/k/a Mikel Knight), 1203 Entertainment,

LLC, and MDRST Marketing/Promotions, LLC (collectively “Plaintiffs”)
sued Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) for: (1) breach of written contract; (2)
negligent misrepresentation; (3) negative interference with prospective
relations; (4) deprivation of rights of publicity under California Civil Code
§ 3344; (5) violation of rights of publicity under California common law;
and (6) unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of the California
Business and Professions Code § 17200. (See Pl. Compl. at 8-11.) The San
Mateo County Superior Court held that Plaintiffs’ first three causes of
action were barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) of the Communications Decency
Act (“Section 230”), which provides certain immunities to companies that
operate “interactive computer service[s].” (Judge Ayoob Order at 4 (May
31, 2016)). The Superior Court ruled that Plaintiffs’ three remaining three
claims could proceed because “[i]n California, rights of publicity claims are
intellectual property laws” and the Communications Decency Act
“explicitly states, ‘Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.’” (Id. at 5 [internal
citations omitted]). Both parties appealed to this Court.
The Court has accepted four amicus curiae briefs in this case, those
of: (1) Public Citizen, Inc. (“Public Citizen Amicus”); (2) the Electronic
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Frontier Foundation et. al (“EFF Amicus”); (3) Airbnb, Inc. et al. (“Airbnb
Amicus”); and (4) Consumer Opinion, LLC and AVVO, Inc. (“Consumer
Opinion Amicus”). These organizations (collectively “Amici”) raised issues
regarding Section 230’s intellectual property law exemption and the
validity of Plaintiffs’ California state law claims. This brief addresses those
issues.
II.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs’ California intellectual property law claims should be

allowed to proceed because Section 230’s civil liability protection for
providers of interactive computer services explicitly exempts “any law
pertaining to intellectual property.” (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).). In California,
publicity rights are a form of intellectual property. (Comedy III Products,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 387 [“The right of publicity . .
. protects a form of intellectual property that society deems to have some
social utility.”]; see also Judge Ayoob Order at 5 (May 31, 2016)). The §
230(e)(2) exemption is not limited to federal intellectual property claims, so
Section 230 does not shield Facebook from Plaintiffs’ valid claims based
on California state intellectual property law. Plaintiffs urge the Court to
affirm Judge Ayoob’s ruling.
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A.

SECTION 230’s INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
EXEMPTION IS NOT LIMITED TO FEDERAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS

Judge Ayoob ruled correctly that Plaintiffs’ statutory and common
law right of publicity claims could proceed because the plain language of
Section 230 does not immunize “interactive computer service” providers
from intellectual property claims. The legislative history of Section 230
also does not suggest Congress intended to immunize service providers
from intellectual property actions.
1.

The Plain Language of 47 U.S.C § 230(e)(2)
Indicates That The Exemption Is Not Limited To
Federal Intellectual Property Claims.

To interpret Section 230’s intellectual property exception, the Court
must first “examine the language of the statute enacted as an initiative,
giving the words their usual, ordinary meaning.” (People v. Canty (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276.) Section 230 provides that: “No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider.” (47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).) The statute defines an “information content provider”
as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service.” (Id. § 230(f)(3).)

But this

immunity provision comes with two important limitations: “Nothing in this

3

section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
intellectual property[,]” id. § 230(e)(2), and “Nothing in this section shall
be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is
consistent with this section[,]” id. § 230(e)(3).
This ordinary meaning of these limitations clearly indicates that
Section 230’s grant of immunity does not extend to Plaintiffs’ intellectual
property claims. Amici understand this and attempt to argue that this Court
should ignore the ordinary meaning of § 230(e)(3) and instead interpret it to
preempt all California laws “pertaining to intellectual property” because
those laws are “inconsistent with” Section 230. The Court should reject
this invitation because it fails to account for the unambiguous meaning of
the phrase “any law pertaining to intellectual property[,]” id. § 230(e)(2).
As another court has noted, “In four different points in Section 230(e),
Congress specified whether it intended a subsection to apply to local, state,
or federal law.” (Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) 603 F.Supp.2d 690, 703.) § 230(e)(1) refers to “any other
Federal criminal statute,” § 230(e)(3) refers to “enforcing any State law”
and “any State or local law,” and § 230(e)(4) refers to “any similar State
law[.]” (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1, 3-4) [emphasis added].). But § 230(e)(2)
does not refer to “any Federal law pertaining to intellectual property”; it
refers to “any law pertaining to intellectual property” (id. [emphasis
added].).
4

In Atlantic Recording, the court held that the § 230(e)(2) intellectual
property exemption encompassed both state and federal law. The court
reasoned that since the words “Federal,” “State,” and “Local” appeared four
different times in subsection (e), if Congress wished to restrict § 230(e)(2)’s
meaning to federal intellectual property claims, it would have done so. (603
F.Supp.2d at 703; see also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. (2002) 534 U.S.
438, 452 [“[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of
a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.”]; Universal Communications Systems, Inc. v.
Lycos, Inc. (1st Cir. 2007) 478 F.3d 413, 422-23 [intellectual property
claims based on Florida state trademark law are not precluded by Section
230]; Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall and Assoc. (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 135 F.Supp.2d
409, 413 [state intellectual property law claims are not precluded by §
230(e)(2) based on the plain language of that subsection]). Section 230 as a
whole also purports to sets forth “the policy of the United States” with
respect to both “Federal or State regulation.” (Id. § 230(b)(2).) This
context from § 230(b) further reinforces the notion that “any law pertaining
to intellectual property” means either state or federal law.
Other courts have adopted this ordinary meaning of § 230(e)(2) as
well. In Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates, for example, the court
stated that the plain language of the intellectual property provision
5

precludes users or providers of interactive computer services from having
immunity against state intellectual property law claims. ((S.D.N.Y. 2001)
135 F.Supp.2d 409, 413.) The First Circuit has followed Gucci America
and also held that Section 230 immunity did not apply to state intellectual
property claims. (Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. (1st
Cir. 2007) 478 F.3d 413, 423 n.7.) This Court should adopt the same logic
and reject Amici’s invitation to disregard the ordinary meaning the phrase
“any law” in § 230(e)(2).
2.

The Legislative History of 47 U.S.C § 230(e)(2)
Confirms That The Exemption Is Not Limited To
Federal Intellectual Property Claims.

The legislative history of the Communications Decency Act
confirms that Section 230’s intellectual property exemption encompasses
both state and federal intellectual property law claims. At the time of
Section 230’s enactment, “Congress wanted to encourage the unfettered
and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote
the development of e-commerce.” (Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d
1018, 1027; see also 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-72.)

Amici argue that

Congress passed the Communications Decency Act primarily to encourage
development of free speech on the internet. Plaintiffs agree that this may
have been one of Congress’s goals, but Amici oversimplify the story by
glossing over Congress’s other motivations. For instance, as the name
“Communications Decency Act” implies, Congress also sought to protect
6

minors from obscene material (E.g., 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-72 [statements
of Representatives Cox, Wyden, Lofgren, and Goodlatte admitting as
much]). The Communications Decency Act ultimately struck a balance
between these competing interests.
The specific circumstances surrounding the enactment of Section
230 also support Plaintiffs’ proposed plain meaning interpretation.
Representatives Cox and Wyden, the primary architects of the amendment
that became Section 230, appeared to be particularly concerned with
overruling a New York state case called Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co. (May 24, 1995) 1995 WL 323710. (See 141 Cong. Rec.
H8469-72.) In Stratton Oakmont, a New York trial court held that an
online service provider could be liable as a publisher of defamatory content
posted by third parties to its website. See 1995 WL 323710 at *10.
Representatives Cox and Wyden accordingly designed a relatively narrow
amendment to “protect[] from liability online services that make a good
faith effort to restrict access to offensive material.” (Robert Cannon, The
Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act:
Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway (1996) 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 51, 68.). These Representative reasoned that providers that
made a “good faith effort to restrict access to offensive material” should not
have to “screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems[.]”
(Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 331.)
7

Plaintiffs are not asking Facebook to “screen each of [its] millions of
postings for possible problems[.]” On the contrary, they asked the service
to address a discrete number of messages that presented a demonstrable
harm to Mr. Knight and his employees. These messages involved death
threats against Mr. Knight and his employees, false accusations about Mr.
Knight’s business that caused attacks on his employees and his property,
and false statements which caused baseless 9-1-1 calls that have wasted the
resources of police departments.

Plaintiffs notified Facebook of the

existence of these specific posts and submitted affidavits to the company
demonstrating the violent effects of keeping them online.

Facebook

erroneously stated that the company was not in a position to act on the
reported content and refused to respond.
The architects of Section 230 intended to create a limited immunity
for content providers that “make a good faith effort to restrict access to
offensive material[.]” (Cannon, supra, at 68.) Facebook failed to do so
here. The Court should acknowledge the multiple motivations behind the
Communications Decency Act and adopt Plaintiffs’ proposed plain
meaning interpretation of Section 230.
3.

The Cases Amici Cite Limiting § 230(e)(2) to
Federal Intellectual Property Claims Are Not
Binding and Are Readily Distinguishable.

Amici cite cases in which courts have held that Section 230
immunity can preclude certain state intellectual property claims. But these
8

cases are not binding on this Court and are readily distinguishable.
Plaintiffs’ claims arise under California statutory and common law and are
properly classified as intellectual property claims. (E.g., Aroa Mktg., Inc. v.
Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 781, 788.) Amici
rightly point out that the appellate court in Hartford did not decide the issue
of whether a right of publicity claim implicates Section 230. But that court
did note that Black’s Law Dictionary includes “publicity rights” within its
definition of “intellectual property,” id., which would close the inquiry
under the plain meaning interpretation discussed above.
Amici rely heavily on Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, a case in which
the Ninth Circuit stated that Section 230’s exemption for “any law
pertaining to intellectual property” referred only to federal intellectual
property law. ((9th Cir. 2007) 488 F.3d 1102.) That court emphasized the
lack of any explicit definition from Congress for this phrase. (Perfect 10.,
488 F.3d at 1118.) In the years following Perfect 10, many courts have
criticized the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion. One stated bluntly that the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning “lacks any support in the plain meaning” of the
statutory text. (Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist Inc. (S.D.N.Y.
2009) 603 F.Supp.2d 690; see also Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc.
(N.H.D.C. 2008) 540 F.Supp.2d 288, 299 [“[T]his court does not find the
Ninth Circuit’s resolution [in Perfect 10] of the statutory interpretation
question to be persuasive.”].) In any event, Ninth Circuit opinions do not
9

bind this Court. (E.g., People v. McCoy (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 974, 982
[“Even on federal questions . . . Ninth Circuit cases do not bind the state
courts.”].)
The court in Perfect 10 also seemed to state in a footnote that the
First Circuit in Universal Communication Systems did not reach the
question regarding Section 230’s intellectual property exemption. (See
Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118 n.5.) But the First Circuit in fact did apply the
ordinary meaning of the words “any law pertaining to intellectual
property,” cited Gucci America’s similar application of the exemption, and
held that the exemption included state intellectual property law. (Universal
Communication Systems, 478 F.3d at 423.)

There, the First Circuit

ultimately held that the plaintiff’s claim failed under the standards of the
relevant state intellectual property law—not that the claim was barred by §
230(c) immunity. (See id. 423 n.7 [“We reason somewhat differently,
holding that even though Section 230 immunity does not apply, the claim
was properly dismissed as a matter of trademark law.”].)

The First

Circuit’s holding in Universal Communication Systems is consistent with
the ordinary meaning of Section 230’s intellectual property exemption.
Amici also refer to the California Supreme Court’s discussion of
Zeran v. American Online, Inc. in Barrett v. Rosenthal. (See Airbnb Amicus
at 15; Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 58; Zeran v. American
Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327.) It is important to note, as Amici
10

quoted, that the Supreme Court’s discussion of “the rule announced in
Zeran and followed in all other jurisdictions” pertained only to “defamation
plaintiffs” and “noticed-based” negligence concerns that were covered by
Section 230 immunity. (See Airbnb Amicus at 15; Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at
58.) The California Supreme Court did not address publicity rights claims,
which are explicitly exempted from Section 230.

Intellectual property

claims like Plaintiffs’ are entirely consistent with Section 230 and Supreme
Court’s discussion in Barrett. (See Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 58.)
B.

PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS HAVE NOTHING TO DO
WITH DEFAMATION

Plaintiffs’ claims arise under California state law and pertain to
publicity rights and unlawful business practices. (Pl. Compl. at 11; Judge
Ayoob Order at 6 (May 31, 2016).)

Plaintiffs are also not “pleading

defamation claims as something else[.]” (See Consumer Opinion Amicus at
5.). They are seeking to vindicate their rights under California statutory
and common law on intellectual property and unfair business practices.
(Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17203; Civ. Code § 3344.)
Amici attempt to argue that Plaintiffs have pleaded mere defamation
claims in a way that circumvents Section 230 immunity in order to “hold
Facebook liable for allegedly false content critical of [the Plaintiffs], and
allegedly damaging to their reputations that was authored by Facebook
users.” (See Airbnb Amicus at 17-18.)
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This argument dangerously

mischaracterizes Plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs’ publicity rights claims arise
from Facebook’s decision to “knowingly and intentionally” use Plaintiffs’
likeness without consent, “for the purpose of advertising” and for
Facebook’s “commercial advantage.” (Pl. Compl. at 11.) These publicity
rights claims can be brought regardless of whether any the content at issue
tends to be positive or negative because the claims focus on the
unauthorized use of another’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner . . . or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases.” (Civ. Code § 3344.) Holding a computer services
provider liable for “allegedly defamatory content,” which Amici are
concerned about, is far different from the present situation of holding the
Facebook liable for its knowing and unauthorized use of another’s likeness
in violation of California laws. (See Airbnb Amicus at 18 [citing Stratton
Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 ].) Plaintiffs have independent claims that may
be brought under California state law.
Traditional defamation claims focus on the intentional act of the
party that publishes defamatory content. (See Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40
Cal.4th 683, 796 [explaining that traditional defamation analysis that
focuses on the words of the speaker].) Here, the focus is largely on what
happened after the content was produced—namely Facebook’s refusal to
remove the content. Plaintiffs are not merely “relabeling a defamation
claim under another theory of liability” to circumvent the Section 230
12

protection that “Congress intended,” but rather is allowing California state
law claims, on which the “Plaintiffs have shown” have a “probability of
prevailing,” to proceed in accordance with the explicit exemption of §
230(e)(2) for “any law pertaining to intellectual property.” (Airbnb Amicus
at 19; Judge Ayoob Order at 6 (May 31, 2016).)

Holding Facebook

responsible for intellectual property law causes of action, which are
explicitly exempted from Section 230 immunity by § 230(e)(2), is far
different from trying to hold a content provider liable for causes of action
that are not exempted. (See Airbnb Amicus at 20 [citing negligence as an
example of a cause of action protected by § 230(c) immunity].)

The

essential nature of the right of publicity and derivative unfair business
practices claims is not to “impose on Facebook liability for allegedly
defamatory third-party content,” Airbnb Amicus at 21, but rather is to hold
the Defendant liable for violating rights of publicity and committing unfair
business practices.
Facebook’s conscious choice to not remove content—including that
concerning publicity rights and business matters—once the Plaintiffs had
notified Facebook of the content’s existence created independent and
legitimate claims that arise under California law. These claims should be
allowed to proceed accordingly.
//
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C.

THE PRESENT CASE POSES NO THREAT TO
SECTION 230

Plaintiffs have asserted claims under California state law. (See Pl.
Compl. at 11; Judge Ayoob Order at 6 (May 31, 2016).) As discussed
above, these claims are consistent with the provisions of Section 230.
There is no reason this case should not be allowed to proceed under the
pertinent laws.
Amici express concerns that this case could “cripple the growth and
development of the Internet industry” and threatens the Section 230
protections for “providers or users of interactive computer services.” (See
Airbnb Amicus at 22.) This is a dramatic overstatement. This case can be
decided for the Plaintiffs under California law consistent with Section 230’s
protections for internet services. As detailed out in the first section of this
response, Section 230 has a specific exemption for intellectual property
law. (See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).) Plaintiffs’ intellectual property claims are
entirely consistent with Section 230. Amici also argue that Section 230
demands “that only the actual creators of online content that causes harm
should be subject to potential liability.” (Airbnb Amicus at 23.) This is
plainly incorrect, as it would render Section 230’s intellectual property
exemption meaningless. Claims like Plaintiffs’ must allowed to proceed.
Additionally, as addressed in Section II of this brief, Plaintiffs’
claims do not attempt hold Facebook liable for all actions of its many users.
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This case focuses on Facebook’s specific, conscious refusal to remove
certain content pertaining to the Plaintiffs, including their likeness, once the
Plaintiffs notified it of the content’s existence and requested removal. This
is a narrow factual circumstance that does not threaten Facebook’s general
operations. Plaintiffs have no interest in attempting to hold Facebook liable
for every action of its users. (See Airbnb Amicus at 27.)
Finally, Amici worry that other persons might follow Plaintiffs and
bring publicity rights claims against online service providers. (See Airbnb
Amicus at 23-24, 26-28.) It is important to remember that such causes of
actions can only arise if publicity rights violations actually occur. If no
violations occur, then the claims do not arise. When such violations do
occur, injured persons—such as Plaintiffs here—have the right to bring
their cases under California law.

Amici frame this case as a conflict

between California’s state intellectual property law and Section 230. This
is a false choice, as these laws do no conflict. Plaintiffs’ causes of action
should be allowed to proceed and Facebook should be held responsible for
any violations.
III.

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision below and allow Plaintiffs’

California state law claims to proceed. Section 230’s plain language and
legislative history support Plaintiffs’ interpretation exempting state
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intellectual property claims from the statute’s limited grant of immunity.
The contrary holdings of other courts, which are flawed in their reasoning
and factually distinguishable from the instant case, are also not binding
upon this Court. Mr. Knight shares many of the concerns of Amici and
support the development of free speech and the internet. He does not want
to remove critical speech from the internet—he merely wants content
providers to remove salacious and violent speech from their websites after
being given notice and evidence of a concrete connection to serious bodily
injury.

California law guarantees him that right, so this Court should

accordingly affirm the decision below.
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